CoCCA is an acronym for Council of Country Code Administrators. The registry software CoCCA authors and maintains is the most widely deployed country code top level domain ("ccTLD") solution in the industry.
Of the 308 delegated ccTLDs, the CoCCA software is used to manage 59 ( 20% ). The CoCCA software is also used to manage six non-country ICANN TLDs. Use of the software requires a CoCCA End User Licence.
CoCCA provides TLD managers with: custom features, priority bug fixes, training, data escrow, failover sites, abuse mitigation tools and AUP complaint resolution services.
The CX, GS, GY, KI, HT, HN, TL, SB, and NF ccTLDs have adopted the CoCCA Complaint Resolution Service (CRS). The CoCCA CRS provides a transparent, efficient and cost effective way for the public, law enforcement, regulatory bodies, and intellectual property owners to have their concerns regarding use of a TLD managers services addressed.
The CoCCA CRS addresses not only rights to a particular domain but also the registrant's use of that domain. Policies apply recursively, and are applicable not only to the domains in the registry but apply equally to any subordinate domain created by the registrant.
The registrants' licence to use a domain requires them to comply with the applicable AUP, a failure to do so or remedy an AUP breach if requested, may result in a suspension of a domain and its removal from the zone.
Any party who believes a domain name registrant has violated a participating TLD manager’s AUP must provide a formal complaint in order for CoCCA to investigate and evaluate the claim or complaint.
If you have an urgent complaint regarding the distribution of child abuse images in a TLD managed by an entity using the CoCCA software please lodge a complaint with both law enforecment and the Internet Watch Foundation. The IWF and/or Law enforcment who will confrim the issue and notify CoCCA for possible action.
In cases where CoCCA has a technical or legal capacity, we will act swiftly on an IWF notice without the need for a formal complaint using the CRS above.
PanopticonPanopticon is a CoCCA domain security initiative, the goal is to:
- Identify possible hosting compromises and automatically notify registrants
- Identify malicious activity for AUP compliance
- Identify suspicious registrations for manual review
PatronsCountry Code Top Level Domain Managers
- Afghanistan | .af | Ministry of Communications and IT
- American Samoa | .as | AS Domain Registry
- Anguila | .ai | Government of Anguilla
- Botswana | .bw | Botswana Communications Regulatory Authority (BOCRA)
- Benin | .bj | Benin -Benin Telecoms S.A.
- Burkina Faso | .bf | ARCE-AutoritÈ de RÈgulation des Communications Electroniques
- Chad | .td | Autorité de Régulation des Communications
- Christmas Island | .cx | Christmas Island Domain Administration
- Congo | .cg | Central African Backbone (CAB)
- Congo, The Democratic Republic Of The) | .cd | Office Congolais des Postes et Télécommunications - OCPT
- Côte d’Ivoire | .ci | Autorité de Régulation des Télécommunications/TIC de Côte d’lvoire (ARTCI)
- Ecuador | .ec | NIC.EC (NICEC) S.A.
- Egypt | xn--wgbh1c مصر | National Telecoms Regulatory Authority
- Fiji | .fj | The University of the South Pacific
- Greenland | .gl | TELE Greenland A/S
- Ghana | .gh | Network Computer Systems Limited
- Guernsey | .gg | Island Networks Ltd
- Guyana | .gy | University of Guyana
- Haiti | .ht | Consortium FDS/RDDH
- Honduras | .hn | Red de Desarrollo Sostenible Honduras
- Iraq | .iq | Communications Media Commission
- Iraq | xn--mgbtx2b عراق | Communications Media Commission
- Jersey | .je | Island Networks Ltd.
- Kenya | .ke | Kenya Network Information Center (KeNIC)
- Kiribati | .ki | Telecommunications Authority of Kiribati
- Kuwait | .kw | Kuwaitnet General Trading & Contracting Co
- Montserrat | .ms | MNI Networks Ltd.
- Morocco | .ma | Agence Nationale de Réglementation des Télécommunications (ANRT)
- Mozambique | .mz | Centro de Informatica de Universidade Eduardo Mondlane
- Lebanon | .lb | Lebanese Domain Registry (LBDR LLC)
- Libya | .ly | Libya Telecom and Technology
- Namibia | .na | Namibia - Namibian Network Information Center
- Nigeria | .ng | Nigeria Internet Registration Association
- Norfolk Island | .nf | Norfolk Island data services
- Peru | .pe | Red Cientifica Peruana
- Rwanda | .rw | Rwanda Information Communication and Technology Association (RICTA)
- Saint Kitts And Nevis | .kn | Ministry of Finance, Sustainable Development Information & Technology
- Solomon Islands | .sb | Solomon Telekom Company Limited
- South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands | .gs | Government of South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands (GSGSSI)
- Sudan | .sd | Sudan Internet Society
- Timor Leste | .tl | Ministry of Transport and Communications
- Zambia | .zm | Zambia Information and Communications Technology Authority (ZICTA)
- .xn--p1acf | .pyc | Rusnames Limited | Russian speaking Community
- .shia | Asia Green IT System | The .SHIA gTLD is intended for Shia Muslim faithful who wish to promote, participate or learn about Islam and its various facets.
- .tci | Asia Green IT System | TCI is well-known among the company's customers, especially those outside their established service area. With an eye towards growing business abroad, TCI has entrusted AGITSys with the development of the TCI gTLD
- .nowruz | Asia Green IT System | People using and familiar with the Persian language know 'nowruz' to mean 'the new day', or 'the new year'
- .pars | Asia Green IT System | The benefits of the .PARS domain will be manifold, not just to registrants but also to tens of millions of Persian internet users, as well as many others with an interest in or curiosity regarding Persia.
- .xn--mgbt3dhd همراه, | Asia Green IT System | "comrade", /hamra/
Last Updated | October 6th, 2021
CoCCA does not have a formal relationship with the ccTLDs below but they are understood to be using the CoCCA registry software.
- Burundi | .bi | Centre National de l'Informatique
- Cameroon | .cm | Cameroon Telecommunications (CAMTEL)
- Dominican republic | .do | Pontificia Universidad Catolica Madre y Maestra
- Egypt | .eg | Egyptian Universities Network (EUN) Supreme Council of Universities
- Madagascar | .mg | NIC-MG (Network Information Center Madagascar)
- Mauritania | .mr | Université des Sciences, de Technologie et de Médecine
- Mauritania | xn--mgbah1a3hjkrd موريتانيا | Université des Sciences, de Technologie et de Médecine
- Mauritius | .mu | Internet Direct Ltd
- Palestinian Territory, Occupied | .ps | Ministry Of Telecommunications & Information Technology, Government Computer Center
- Palestinian Territory, Occupied | xn--ygbi2ammx فلسطين | Ministry Of Telecommunications & Information Technology, Government Computer Center
- Philipines | .ph | DotPH
- Syria | .sy | National Agency for Network Services (NANS)
- Syria | xn--ogbpf8fl سورية | National Agency for Network Services (NANS)
- Turks and Caicos Islands | .tc | Melrex TC
- Virgin Islands | .vi | Virgin Islands Public Telecommunications System, Inc.
- Yemen | .ye | TeleYemen
- Data regarding registrants in the following TLDs is collected and stored in the EU - af, as, ci, cx, gs, gy, ht, ki, kn, nf, tl, zm, pyc, shia, pars, nowruz, همراه .
- Following the principle of data minimisation, data on only one contact (the Registrant) is required. Registrars are not required to lodge Administrative Contact, Billing Contact, or Technical contact information with the Registry.
- Data is stored as a Contact Object in the Registry. Effective July 2020, unless specifically requested by the Data Subject, Contact Objects are to be purged seven (7) years after they cease to be linked to a domain object.
- The designated TLD manager, CoCCA staff, law enforcement and the controlling registrar all have access to Contact Objects in the registry.
- Data stored in Contact Objects will, if required, be used to identify and communicate with the individual responsible for compliance with TLD policy, applicable public policy and legislation.
- If the Contact Object contains personal information on an EU Data Subject, the personal information it is redacted from WHOIS. If the Contact Object contains information on an Organisation the information may be redacted.
- Data submitted and maintained in the registry is secured in transit using TLS 1.2 and where applicable and required, encrypted in the registry database.